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Genocide, mass killing, torture, ethnic cleansing, and other gross violations of human 
rights are defined as war crimes or crimes against humanity under international law. To 
develop an adequate explanation of such actions, which is the task of social psychology, 
and an adequate legal response to them, which is the task of international law, requires 
going beyond the characteristics of individual perpetrators or even of the situations in 
which these practices take place. It requires close examination of the political system and 
of the policy process in which these actions are embedded and that provide the larger 
context for them.  
 
1. Crimes of obedience 
 
As a first step in this examination, we must define the special nature of the crimes under 
consideration. Some instances of such crimes may well constitute “ordinary” crimes—
that is, crimes committed in violation of the expectations and instructions of authority. 
Participation in massacre, torture, or ethnic cleansing would be an ordinary crime in this 
sense if it were carried out by individual perpetrators on their own initiative and in 
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87(857) International Review of the Red Cross 123. disregard of the policies and orders of the authorities under which they function. Even a 
crime committed in the context of an authorized activity—such as a military operation or 
interrogation of prisoners—could be treated as an ordinary crime if the perpetrator went 
beyond legally permissible limits: if, for example, a soldier on a reconnaissance mission 
indiscriminately shot civilians, or if an interrogator used means of pressure in excess of 
what the rules permitted. 
 
The essence of international crimes, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
however, is that they are generally not ordinary crimes, but crimes of obedience: crimes 
that take place, not in opposition to the authorities, but under explicit instructions from 
the authorities to engage in these acts, or in an environment in which such acts are 
implicitly sponsored, expected, or at least tolerated by the authorities. Lee Hamilton and I 
have defined a crime of obedience as ‘an act performed in response to orders from 
authority that is considered illegal or immoral by the larger community’.
1 Torture 
provides a clear example of a crime of obedience: It is considered illegal and immoral by 
the international community; it is a crime under the U.N. Convention against Torture of 
1984
2 and other relevant international frameworks; and it is similarly defined in the 
national legal codes of many of the U.N.’s member states. Yet it is the authorities of these 
                                                 
1 H.C. Kelman and V.L. Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and 
Responsibility (1989) 46.  
2 JH Burgers and H Danelius, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Handbook on the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1988) 
177–178. 
  2very states that often order, encourage, or tolerate systematic policies or sporadic acts of 
torture. 
 
When does an ordinary crime become a crime of obedience? It is often the case—in acts 
of torture as much as in massacre and other gross violations of human rights—that the 
perpetrators engage in the action willingly, enthusiastically, and with varying degrees of 
innovation. But ‘the fact that a criminal action serves various personal motives or is 
carried out with a high degree of initiative and personal involvement does not necessarily 
remove it from the category of crimes of obedience’,
3 as long as the action is supported 
by the authority structure: as long as the perpetrators believe and have good reason to 
believe that the action is authorized, expected, at least tolerated, and probably approved 
by the authorities—that it conforms with official policy and reflects what their superiors 
would want them to do. To be sure, those who commit these crimes with enthusiasm and 
initiative are more culpable, from a legal and moral point of view, than those who 
commit them reluctantly in response to explicit orders. However, whether the action is 
caused or merely justified by explicit or implicit orders from superiors, it can be 
described as a crime of obedience, on the presumption that it would not have taken place 
without authorization. 
 
Recognizing these actions as crimes of obedience immediately directs our attention to the 
other side of the coin: to the crimes of authority that invariably accompany crimes of 
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Responsibility (1989) 50. 
 
  3obedience. For every subordinate who performs criminal acts under official orders or 
with the encouragement or toleration of the authorities, there is a superior—or typically 
an entire hierarchy of superiors—who issue the orders and who formulate the policies 
that require or permit these acts. Higher-level superiors may in fact not have issued 
specific orders to engage in these criminal acts, but they are the ones who formulate the 
policies, create the atmosphere, and establish the framework within which officials at 
intermediate levels of the hierarchy translate general policy directives into specific orders 
and actions on the ground.   
 
The fact that crimes of obedience take place within a hierarchical structure makes it 
especially difficult to pinpoint responsibility for them. Subordinates deny responsibility 
by reference to superior orders. Superiors are often able to deny responsibility because 
they are various steps removed from the actions themselves and can claim that the 
initiative was taken at a lower level or that their instructions were misunderstood. The top 
leadership is protected by the difficulty in establishing causal links between the general 
atmosphere and policy directives they convey and the practices designed and carried out 
at lower levels of the hierarchy. The issue of assignment of responsibility in such 
situations is a central theme of the work reported in Crimes of Obedience,
4 which began 
with a national survey of the U.S. population on public reactions to the conviction of Lt. 
                                                 
4 HC Kelman and VL Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and 
Responsibility (1989). 
  4William Calley for the My Lai massacre in Vietnam
5—a prime example of what I have 
called sanctioned massacres.
6  
 
The important question in determining responsibility is not “who is responsible?” —the 
actor or the authority—but “who is responsible for what?” When the question is framed 
that way, it becomes clear that both ought to be held responsible. The actors themselves 
are properly held responsible for the actions they perform and the harm they cause, even 
if they are acting under superior orders. Since the adoption of the Nuremberg Principles 
after World War II, which have been incorporated into the military codes of all Western 
states, superior orders cannot be used as an absolute defense for criminal actions on the 
part of subordinates. The U.N. Convention against Torture specifically applies this 
principle to torturers when it states that ‘an order from a superior officer or a public 
authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture.
7 Subordinates have the 
obligation to evaluate the legality of orders and to disobey those orders that they know or 
should have known to be illegal.   
 
                                                 
5 HC Kelman and L Hamilton Lawrence, ‘Assignment of Responsibility in the Case of Lt Calley: 
Preliminary Report on a National Survey’ (1972) 28(1) Journal of Social Issues; HC Kelman and VL 
Hamilton, ‘Availability for Violence: A Study of US Public Reactions to the Trial of Lt Calley’ in JD Ben-
Dak (ed), The Future of Collective Violence: Societal and Intersocietal Perspectives (1974). 
6 HC Kelman, ‘Violence without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and 
Victimizers’ (1973) 29(4) Journal of Social Issues. 
7 JH Burgers and H Danelius, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Handbook on the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1988) 178. 
  5Superiors, for their part, have the obligation to consider the consequences of the policies 
they set and to oversee the ways in which those policies are translated into specific orders 
and actions as they move down the ladder. The authorities’ obligation of oversight makes 
the defense of ignorance of or lack of control over the actions of subordinates generally 
unacceptable, since they are expected to know and to control what their subordinates are 
doing. Of course, more often than not, massacre and torture do not result from negligence 
at the top, but from deliberate policy—or perhaps deliberate inattention at the top to the 
way in which policy is carried out below.   
 
2. The policy context 
 
Conceptualizing international crimes as crimes of obedience implies that they must be 
understood in the context of the policy process that gives rise to them and of the authority 
structure within which this policy is carried out. To concretize my analysis of the policy 
context of international crimes, I focus specifically on torture as a case in point. The same 
logic applies, however, to sanctioned massacres, to systematic expulsions, and to other 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
 
The issue of torture—particularly in situations of armed conflict or in the fight against 
terrorism—received widespread international attention when the abuses of Iraqi prisoners 
by U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib came to light in the spring of 2004. Torture, of course, is 
not a peculiarly American phenomenon. Unfortunately, it is widely practiced in many 
parts of the world; moreover, it is endemic to autocratic states and is far less prevalent in 
  6democratic ones. Abu Ghraib serves as a reminder, however, that even democratic states 
may resort to torture when a particular set of social conditions is in place, and it 
illustrates the policy context in which the practice of torture is embedded. 
 
In the case of Abu Ghraib, the findings of the investigative reporter, Seymour Hersh
8—
the same man, incidentally, who broke the story of the My Lai massacre and its cover-
up
9—make it evident that the abuses were part of a systematic process. They took place 
in the context of interrogation and were apparently designed to ‘soften up’ prisoners for 
questioning by intelligence officers. No doubt, some of the perpetrators engaged in these 
actions with a greater degree of initiative and sadistic enjoyment than others, but they 
were operating in an atmosphere of pressure to produce intelligence information from 
prisoners presumed to be guilty. Whether or not some of the specific abuses and acts of 
torture were directly ordered, indications are that they were expected, condoned, and 
encouraged by higher officers. Commanding officers along the different tiers of the 
hierarchy have been accused, at the least, of exercising insufficient oversight of the 
conditions of detention and procedures of interrogation that prevailed in Abu Ghraib and 
other military prisons for suspected terrorists.   
 
In the months following the exposure of the Abu Ghraib abuses, it became increasingly 
evident that the treatment of the Abu Ghraib prisoners was not an isolated occurrence, 
                                                 
8 S Hersh, ‘Torture at Abu Ghraib’ (2004) 80(11) The New Yorker; S Hersh, ‘Chain of Command’ (2004) 
80(12) The New Yorker. 
9 S Hersh, My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and its Aftermath (1970); S Hersh, Cover-Up (1972). 
  7nor was it simply the product of decisions and actions (or inaction) at the local level. 
Similar patterns of abuse, linked to aggressive interrogation techniques, occurred in 
prisons elsewhere in Iraq, and—going back to 2002—in Afghanistan and Guantánamo 
Bay. Numerous documents show that the techniques and practices revealed in Abu 
Ghraib had “migrated” from Guantánamo and Afghanistan and that they were authorized 
or justified at various points by high-ranking officials in the Pentagon and the White 
House.
10 For example, memos circulating in upper echelons of the administration 
authorized harsh interrogation techniques; defined torture so narrowly that many forms of 
painful, debilitating, and degrading treatment became permissible; and suggested that the 
Geneva Conventions did not apply to ‘unlawful combatants’.
11 The mistreatment of 
prisoners revealed by the various reports, particularly given the context in which it 
occurred, has all the earmarks of physical and mental torture. And, indeed, the accounts 
presented in these reports are highly reminiscent of what is known about the conditions 
that have given rise to torture so often in the past anywhere in the world.   
 
While I look to the policy process and the authority structure to identify the major 
determinants of acts of torture as well as the major correctives against these practices, I 
do not minimize the role of individual and cultural differences. With respect to individual 
differences, I am sure there is a certain degree of self-selection of individuals who 
                                                 
10 M Danner, Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror (2004); S Strasser, The Abu 
Ghraib Investigation: The Official Independent Panel and Pentagon Reports on the Shocking Prisoner 
Abuse in Iraq (2004). 
11 cf K Zernike, ‘Newly Released Reports Show Early Concern on Prison Abuse’ New York Times (6 
January 2005). 
  8gravitate to the role of torturer. Moreover, those operating within the role vary in the 
amount of enthusiasm, diligence, and innovativeness that they bring to the task. No doubt 
differences in personality and background play an important part in determining who 
becomes a torturer and who acts out that role eagerly and with evident enjoyment. But a 
focus on structural factors helps us understand why many, perhaps most, torturers are not 
sadists but ordinary people, doing what they understand to be their jobs. I might add that 
individual differences in readiness to engage in torture may be related as much to 
people’s orientation toward authority as they are to their propensity toward aggression or 
their sense of compassion.
12  
 
Cultural differences—particularly differences in political culture—no doubt also play an 
important role. Thus, Berto Jongman
13 showed that human rights violations, including 
torture, were much more likely to occur in non-democratic than in democratic societies 
(84 per cent v. 25 per cent); and in countries at low levels than in those at high levels of 
development (84 per cent v. 31 per cent). Democratic countries are less likely to practice 
torture precisely because of the nature of their policy process and authority structure. But 
torture does occur even in highly developed democratic societies, usually in the context 
of counter-terrorist activities or armed conflict, as the experiences of Guantánamo Bay 
and Abu Ghraib well illustrate. There are social conditions under which democratic 
cultures that ordinarily respect human rights may sanction torture, just as there are social 
                                                 
12 HC Kelman and VL Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and 
Responsibility (1989) chs 11 and 12. 
13 B Jongman, ‘Why Some States Kill and Torture while Others Do Not’ (1991) 3(1) PLOOM Newsletter.  
  9conditions under which ordinary, decent individuals may be induced to take part in it. 
Thus, while individual and cultural factors are important determinants of torture, they 
operate in interaction with the policy process and the authority structure that ultimately 
give rise to the practice.  
 
How can we account for torture and its characteristic manifestations within this 
framework—both at the macro-level and at the micro-level? At the macro-level, what are 
the structural and situational conditions that encourage and enable the relevant authorities 
to use torture as an instrument of policy? At the micro-level, what are the conditions that 
encourage and enable individuals and organizations to participate when asked to 
implement this policy? 
 
3. The use of torture as an instrument of policy 
 
Torture has been practiced by collective actors other than states, such as guerrilla groups 
or liberation movements, but it has been analyzed primarily as a phenomenon linked to 
the state. The emergence or reemergence of torture as an instrument of policy in the 
twentieth century is directly related to the nature of the modern state. In particular, as 
Edward Peters
14 argues in his historical study, torture arises from the combination of two 
features of the modern state: its vast power and its enormous vulnerability to state 
enemies, internal and external. The power of the modern state rests in the extent to which 
it affects all aspects of the life of its citizens and the resources that it can mobilize to 
control its population. The vulnerability of the modern state stems from the high degree 
                                                 
14 E Peters, Torture (1985). 
  10of interdependence of the political, economic, and social institutions required to run a 
modern society and the resulting ease with which social order can disintegrate and the 
political authorities can lose control when their legitimacy declines in the eyes of their 
population or when they confront terrorism and insurgency.   
 
The conditions conducive to the rise of torture as an instrument of state policy are the 
authorities’ perception of an active threat to the security of the state from internal and 
external sources; the availability of a security apparatus, which enables the authorities to 
use the vast power at their disposal to counter that threat by repressive means; and the 
presence within the society of groups defined as enemies of or potential threats to the 
state (see Table 1). 
Table 1: The policy context of torture 
SOCIAL PROCESSES FACILITATING TORTURE  CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE 
TO THE USE OF TORTURE 
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF 
POLICY 
At Level of Policy Formation  At Level of Implementation 
Perception of a Security 
Threat 
Justification of a policy of 
torture 
Authorization of acts of torture 
Existence of a Security 
Apparatus 
Development of professional 
torture cadres 
Routinization of torture 
practices 
Presence of Groups Defined 
as Enemies of the State 
Exclusion of target groups 
from protection of the state 
Dehumanization of targets of 
torture 
Source: HC Kelman, ‘The Policy Context of Torture: A Social-Psychological Analysis’ (2005) 87(857) 
International Review of the Red Cross 128. Reprinted by permission of the publisher, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross. 
 
  11The recourse to repression is particularly likely in situations in which opposition 
represents a challenge to the legitimacy of those in power and thus a fundamental threat 
to their continued ability to maintain power, such as states in which the rulers’ legitimacy 
rests on a unitary, unchangeable ideology (political or religious), or states run by a ruling 
clique with an extremely narrow population base (in socioeconomic and/or ethnic terms) 
but with the support of military forces. However, torture may also be used, sporadically 
or sometimes systematically, by democratic regimes that find themselves in charge of 
ethnically distinct populations or subpopulations that do not accept their rule—such as 
Israel in the occupied territories or Britain in Northern Ireland.  
 
When state authorities resort to torture, they can often point to a history of violence 
directed against the state: in the form of insurgency, guerrilla operations, or terrorist acts. 
To be sure, torture may at times be applied to individuals whose only crime is political or 
religious dissent, or even mere membership in a religious or ethnic community that does 
not fit into the ruling group’s scheme of things. Even where there is a history of violence, 
the apparatus of torture is not particularly discriminating in the selection of its victims. 
Individuals who have not participated in violent action at all may be singled out for 
torture for any number of reasons: because they are members of or supporters of political 
opposition groups; because they belong to an ethnic, religious, or even professional 
category—as happened in Argentina during its “dirty war”
15—that is generally suspect; 
because they are deemed guilty by association (perhaps because they are related to 
suspects); or simply because they are picked up at random or on the basis of mistaken 
                                                 
15 See A Elon, ‘A Letter from Argentina’ (21 July 1986) The New Yorker. 
  12identity. Still, the occurrence or perceived threat of violence against the state is central to 
the rationale for a policy of torture.
16  
 
Given the centrality of the threat of violence in the rationale for a policy of torture in 
modern times, it is not surprising that torture is particularly likely to occur in the context 
of war or armed conflict. Although my analysis so far has focused on torture within the 
state, aimed at repressing domestic groups or populations whom the authorities perceive 
as internal threats to the security of the state or as agents and allies of external enemies of 
the state, it is equally applicable to situations of war and occupation, in which torture may 
be used against members or suspected supporters of the enemy camp. The use of torture 
in war situations—often directed at civilians, as well as at military personnel—has 
become more probable as war has moved from the classical clash between organized 
armed forces to a clash between whole populations, in which civilian groups are often 
specifically targeted.
17 Torture in this context may be used as part of a state’s policy of 
control and repression of the population and as an instrument of interrogation or 
psychological warfare. The conditions conducive to the use of torture in situations of 
armed conflict are identical to those outlined in the table. Once again, democratic regimes 
are not immune to the use of torture under these conditions, as the U.S. actions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq so clearly illustrate. 
 
 
                                                 
16 WS Heinz, ‘The Military, Torture and Human Rights: Experiences from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay’ in RD Crelinsten and AP Schmid (eds), The Politics of Pain: Torturers and their Masters (1993). 
17 M Shaw, War and Genocide: Organized Killing in Modern Society (2003).  
  134. Social processes facilitating a policy of torture 
 
At the level of policy formation, there are three important points at which the perceived 
threat to the security of the state provides the rationale for a policy of torture, and the 
power of the state enables it to implement that policy: in establishing the purpose and 
justification of the torture, in recruiting the agents or perpetrators of the torture, and in 
defining the targets of the torture (see table).   
 
First, the essential justification of torture, as has already been proposed, is the protection 
of the state against internal and external threats to its security—which often means the 
maintenance in power of those more or less narrow elements of the population that have 
gained control of the state apparatus. The practice of torture is justified by reference to 
the particular doctrine of the state’s legitimization: maintaining law and order or stability, 
or the rule of “the people” whom the state claims to embody, or the rule of God, or the 
survival of Western civilization, or the integrity of national institutions. In war situations, 
of course, the justification for taking up arms, generally couched in terms of defense 
against threats to national security and to the vital interests of the state, also covers 
whatever steps are deemed necessary—including torture—to achieve the military 
objectives. 
 
Second, the agents of torture are defined as a professional force with a significant role in 
protecting the state against internal threats to its security. The power of the state allows it 
to mobilize the necessary resources to establish a torture apparatus. A central component 
  14of that mobilization process is the recruitment of a cadre of torture practitioners through 
the development of what is in effect an organized profession—a profession that is wholly 
owned by the state, that operates within the state’s internal security framework, and that 
is dedicated to the service and protection of the state. Like other professionals, torturers 
undergo a rigorous process of professional training, socialization, and indoctrination to 
prepare them for their roles.
18 Typically, this process includes torture resistance training, 
which acclimatizes them to cruelty.
19 (In war situations, it might be noted here, 
acclimatization to violence and cruelty is a daily occurrence, requiring no specialized 
training.) Another element of the professionalization of torture is that it has become an 
international enterprise. Torturers from different parts of the world come together in 
international meetings in which they share information about training procedures and 
torture techniques. The similarity in the techniques of torture used across the world is 
startling. Some of this is probably due to independent discovery and innovation, but 
much of it can be credited to professional exchange. 
 
Third, the targets of torture are defined as enemies of the state who constitute serious 
threats to the state’s security and survival. For that, as well as for other reasons, such as 
their ethnicity or ideology, they are placed outside the protection of the state. In the 
                                                 
18 H Radtke, ‘Torture as an Illegal Means of Control’ in F Bockle and J Pohier (eds), The Death Penalty 
and Torture (1979); JT Gibson, ‘Factors Contributing to the Creation of Torture’ in P Suefeld (ed), 
Psychology and Torture (1990). 
19 H Radtke, ‘Torture as an Illegal Means of Control’ in F Bockle and J Pohier (eds), The Death Penalty 
and Torture (1979); RD Crelinsten, ‘In Their Own Words: The World of the Torturer’ in RD Crelinsten 
and AP Schmid (eds), The Politics of Pain: Torturers and their Masters (1993). 
  15modern state, individual rights in effect derive from the state. Thus, to be excluded from 
the state—to be denied the rights of citizenship—is tantamount to becoming a non-person 
vulnerable to arbitrary treatment, to torture, and ultimately to extermination. Targets of 
torture in the context of armed conflict are, by definition, placed in the category of 
enemies, who are not entitled to the protection of the state. In principle, enemy 
combatants and civilian populations are protected against torture and other violations of 
their human rights by the Geneva Conventions.
20 In practice, people categorized as 
enemies in a war situation are vulnerable to being targeted for torture. 
 
5. Social processes facilitating participation in torture 
 
The three points at which the security concerns and power of the state contribute to a 
policy of torture at the macro-level—i.e., the justification for torture, the agents of 
torture, and the targets of torture—can be linked to three social processes that facilitate 
participation in torture at the micro-level: the processes of authorization, routinization, 
and dehumanization, which I distinguished in my earlier analysis of sanctioned massacres 
and other crimes of obedience.
21 The justification of torture as a means of protecting the 
state against threats to its security helps to authorize the practice; the development of a 
                                                 
20 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention III) (Geneva, 12 
August 1949; 75 UNTS 135); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War (Geneva Convention IV) (Geneva, 12 August 1949; 75 UNTS 287). 
21 HC Kelman, ‘Violence without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and 
Victimizers’ (1973) 29(4) Journal of Social Issues; HC Kelman and VL Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience: 
Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility (1989). 
  16profession of torturers as part of the state’s security apparatus helps to routinize  the 
administration of torture; and the designation of the targets of torture as enemies of the 
state who are excluded from the state’s protection helps to dehumanize the victims (see 
table, right-hand column).  
 
In the analysis of sanctioned massacres I argued that, to understand participation in 
massacre or genocide, it is less important to explore the forces that push people into 
performing such violent acts than to explore those forces that contribute to the weakening 
of moral restraints against performing these acts—acts that people would normally find 
unacceptable. Within this framework, authorization helps to define the situation in a way 
that makes standard moral principles inapplicable: The individual is not acting as an 
independent moral agent and therefore feels absolved of the responsibility to make 
personal moral choices. Through routinization, the action becomes organized in a way 
that eliminates the opportunity to raise moral questions and make moral decisions: The 
action is divided among many individuals and sub-units of the organization; each 
individual carries out routine tasks without having to think of the overall product to 
which these tasks contribute; euphemisms further enable individuals to ignore the overall 
meaning of the tasks they are performing; altogether, the actions come to be seen as part 
of a normal job rather than participation in massacre or genocide. Finally, 
dehumanization of the victims makes it unnecessary for perpetrators to relate to them in 
moral terms, since it excludes the victims from the perpetrators’ moral community. 
 
  17These three social processes apply to torturers as much as to participants in massacre or 
other crimes of obedience. In the case of torture, it is particularly clear that these 
processes are mediated to a significant degree by the torturers’ relationship to the state.   
 
The role of authorization is strengthened by the fact that torturers, typically, are not just 
acting within a hierarchy in which they are expected to obey—and have indeed been 
trained to obey without question
22—but they are participating in an action that represents 
a transcendent mission. They have come to share the view of the authorities that the task 
they are engaged in serves a higher purpose that transcends any moral scruples they 
might bring to the situation. They have come to see themselves as playing an important 
part in an effort to protect the state: to ensure its security and continued integrity, to 
maintain law and order, or to keep alive the fundamental values of the state that are being 
subjected to a merciless onslaught by ruthless enemies who are intent on destroying it. 
This view of the purpose of the torture project as part of a noble effort, in which the 
perpetrators are prepared to play their role despite any moral reservations and feelings of 
repugnance they might have, greatly enhances the legitimacy of the enterprise.   
 
An additional element of the torture situation that contributes to its perceived legitimacy 
is the participation of medical professionals, who often play an active role by evaluating 
victims’ physical capacity to go through the process, by making sure that the torture does 
                                                 
22 JT Gibson, ‘Factors Contributing to the Creation of Torture’ in P Suedfeld (ed), Psychology and Torture 
(1990). 
  18not go beyond the point of causing the victim to die, and by performing other functions.
23 
Incidentally, the role of physicians in interrogations that are tantamount to torture has 
also been noted in the Abu Ghraib situation.
24 Physicians have also played a role in 
developing torture techniques, including brainwashing and related psychological methods 
of torture. An extreme example of the role of physicians in legitimizing torture and the 
systematic killing of “undesirables” and enemies of the state is the case of the Nazi 
doctors, who helped to formulate the biomedical vision underlying the Nazi genocidal 
programs.
25
 
The justification of torture as a necessary means of ferreting out “the truth” also helps to 
surround it with an aura of legitimacy, as does the legal context in which it often takes 
place. One of the common uses of torture is as an adjunct to judicial proceedings, where 
it is designed to obtain evidence to be introduced into trials. This practice goes back to 
the early uses of torture—in the Roman period and in the Middle Ages—as a central part 
of the process of producing a confession, which was deemed necessary to establish the 
guilt of the accused.
26  
 
                                                 
23 SV Faraone, ‘Psychology’s Role in the Campaign to Abolish Torture: Can Individuals and Organizations 
Make a Difference?’ in P Suedfeld (ed), Psychology and Torture (1990); see also JM Arrigo, ‘A Utilitarian 
Argument against Torture Interrogation of Terrorists’ (2004) 10(3) Science and Engineering Ethics. 
24 eg, MG Bloche and JH Marks, ‘When Doctors Go to War’ (2005) 29(11) The New England Journal of 
Medicine. 
25 RJ Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (1986). 
26 E Peters, Torture (1985). 
  19Routinization of torture is enhanced by the establishment of torturers as a professional 
group (as described in the previous section), which contributes to normalizing and 
ennobling their work. Torturers come to see themselves as performing a job, as doing 
their duty. It is a job that often involves hard work, that can lead to promotion and other 
rewards, that may offer opportunities to demonstrate innovativeness, that one can excel in 
and become expert in. Above all, it is a job that one can be proud of because it is 
perceived as a special profession that provides a significant service to the state and often 
carries with it membership in an elite corps. Although some torturers may seek out this 
occupation because of their sadistic inclinations, many are ordinary people who come to 
this work through a number of different routes. 
 
The torture process itself also shows signs of considerable routinization. It usually 
involves a series of steps, clearly identified, and following each other in regular sequence. 
The different torture techniques, as well as the different torture chambers, are typically 
designated by special names, often with a euphemistic or ironic quality. These names are 
not so much designed to hide the reality of what is actually taking place as to give 
expression to a professional culture with its own rituals and language.
27 The procedures 
used by torture organizations—including a variety of psychological techniques—are 
often quite sophisticated. All of this helps to give the work an aura of professionalism, 
which allows the torturer to perceive it, not as an act of cruelty against another human 
being, but as the routine application of specialized knowledge and skills.  
                                                 
27 H Radtke, ‘Torture as an Illegal Means of Control’ in F Bockle and J Pohier (eds), The Death Penalty 
and Torture (1979). 
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In dehumanization, too, the state is an important part of the equation. The exclusion of 
torture victims from the torturer’s moral community goes back, in fact, to the early 
history of torture. In the Roman legal system, torture—as a means of obtaining 
confessions—was originally applied only to slaves and foreigners, but not to citizens.
28 
In contemporary practice, as well, torture victims are or are treated as non-citizens. The 
main source of their dehumanization is their designation as enemies of the state who have 
placed themselves outside the moral community shared by the rest of the population. 
They are described as terrorists, insurgents, or dissidents who endanger the state and are 
bent on undermining law and order and destroying the community. The view of torture 
victims as non-citizens, who are not entitled to the protection of the state, was evident in 
interviews that Heinz
29 conducted with “masters of torture” in Latin America: Once they 
identified guerrillas as Communists, they saw them as foreign agents and thus, in effect, 
“denaturalized.” Furthermore, torture increased when guerrillas began killing military 
officers and their families, because they came to be seen as not only outsiders, who are 
not entitled to the community’s protection, but as dangerous elements, against whom the 
community had a right to protect itself.   
 
A central assumption in the contemporary practice of torture—just as in the early days, 
when it was used as a systematic part of criminal legal procedures—is that the victims are 
                                                 
28 E Peters, Torture (1985). 
29 WS Heinz, ‘The Military, Torture and Human Rights: Experiences from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay’ in RD Crelinsten and AP Schmid (eds), The Politics of Pain: Torturers and their Masters (1993). 
  21guilty. The torture apparatus operates on the assumption that those who are brought in for 
torture are guerrillas, insurgents, or terrorists, who have committed and/or are about to 
commit dangerous crimes against the state. Thus, torture is designed only to punish the 
guilty, to warn their accomplices, and—most important—to elicit the truth from them. 
Indeed, torture is often justified on the grounds that it is the only way to elicit information 
necessary for the protection of the state and its citizens—such as information about the 
identity and whereabouts of terrorist leaders or about planned terrorist operations—that 
the torture victims are presumed to have in their possession.  
 
A contributing factor to the dehumanization of torture victims is the fact that—even when 
they are citizens of the state that tortures them—they are often outside the ethnic or 
religious community of the torturers and of the dominant sector of the society. This has 
been the case, among many others, for Kurds in Iraq, for Bahais in Iran, for Palestinians 
in Kuwait and in the Israeli-occupied territories, for Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland, 
or for Bosnian Muslims in the former Yugoslavia. In many cases, the victims’ ethnic or 
religious identity is itself the primary reason for their vulnerability to torture. In other 
cases, ethnic or religious identity is a factor in dissent or insurgency. In all cases, it 
facilitates exclusion and dehumanization, thus removing one of the constraints against 
torture and other serious violations of human rights.  
 
 
 
 
  226. Conclusion 
 
Using torture as the primary illustration, the present analysis suggests some of the 
conditions under which practices constituting international crimes can become 
instruments of state policy and the authority structure of the state is fully mobilized to 
implement that policy: the perception by state authorities that the security of the state is 
under severe threat—which, at the macro-level, serves to justify these practices and, at 
the micro-level, contributes to their authorization; the existence of an elaborate and 
powerful apparatus charged with protecting the security of the state—which, at the 
macro-level, provides the infrastructure for implementing such practices and, at the 
micro-level, contributes to their routinization; and the existence of groups within the state 
or under its control that are defined as enemies of the state—which, at the macro-level, 
excludes them from protection of the state and, at the micro-level, contributes to their 
dehumanization.  
 
These conditions are endemic to the autocratic security state. Thus, torture and other 
gross violations of human rights are much less likely to take place in states governed with 
the consent of the governed, whose leaders and officials are accountable for their policies 
and actions. However, even Western democratic societies are not invulnerable to the 
conditions that tempt state authorities to adopt such practices as policy instruments and 
that enable them to implement policies that rely on these practices: the perception of 
fundamental threats to the security and integrity of the state; the existence of bureaucratic 
organizations charged with ensuring state security, staffed by professionally trained 
  23security specialists, and allowed to operate with greater secrecy and less accountability 
than is customary in democratic societies; and the presence of foreign, poorly integrated, 
or non-citizen elements within the population or under the state’s control that can easily 
be seen as outside of the contract that obligates citizens and state to one another in a 
democratic polity.  These conditions are particularly likely to arise in the context of 
armed conflict—whether civil or international—in which the threat to the state is readily 
personified in an internal or external enemy, bent on violence and destruction. The 
combination of these conditions can override the constraints and bypass the scrutiny, 
imposed by democratic values and institutions, that usually stand in the way of gross 
violations of human rights in democratic societies. These, then, are the conditions that 
must be addressed—wherever they manifest themselves—as we seek to develop 
approaches to enhancing accountability for system-generated international crimes, not 
only on the part of individuals at all levels of the system’s hierarchy, but on the part of 
the system itself. 
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